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Abstract
In this paper, we study the Nash dynamics of strategic interplays of n buyers in a matching market
setup by a seller, the market maker. Taking the standard market equilibrium approach, upon receiving
submitted bid vectors from the buyers, the market maker will decide on a price vector to clear the
market in such a way that each buyer is allocated an item for which he desires the most (a.k.a., a market
equilibrium solution). While such equilibrium outcomes are not unique, the market maker chooses one
(max-eq) that optimizes its own objective — revenue maximization. The buyers in turn change bids to
their best interests in order to obtain higher utilities in the next round’s market equilibrium solution.
This is an (n+ 1)-person game where buyers place strategic bids to gain the most from the market
maker’s equilibrium mechanism. The incentives of buyers in deciding their bids and the market maker’s
choice of using the max-eq mechanism create a wave of Nash dynamics involved in the market. We
characterize Nash equilibria in the dynamics in terms of the relationship between max-eq and min-
eq (i.e., minimum revenue equilibrium), and develop convergence results for Nash dynamics from the
max-eq policy to a min-eq solution, resulting an outcome equivalent to the truthful VCG mechanism.
Our results imply revenue equivalence between max-eq and min-eq, and address the question that
why short-term revenue maximization is a poor long run strategy, in a deterministic and dynamic setting.
1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium paradigm in Economics has been based on a rationality assumption that each individual
will maximize its own utility function. Making it further to a dynamic process where multiple agents play
interactively in a repeated game, the Nash dynamics refers to a process where participants take turns
to choose a strategy to maximize their own utility function. We pose the question of what impact of
such strategic behavior of the seller, as the market maker, can have on Nash dynamics of the buyers in a
matching market setting [28], where the seller has m products and there are n unit-demand potential buyers
with different private values vij for different items.
We base our consideration on the market equilibrium framework: The market maker chooses a non-
negative price vector and an allocation vector; the outcome is called a market competitive equilibrium if
all items with positive prices are sold out and everyone gets his maximum utility at the corresponding
allocation, measured by the difference between the buyer’s value of the item and the charged price, i.e.,
vij − pj. To achieve its own objective, i.e., revenue maximization, the market maker is naturally to set all
items the highest possible prices so that there is still a supported allocation vector that clears the market
and maximizes everyone’s utility. This yields a seller-optimal outcome and is called a maximum competitive
equilibrium. Alternatively, at another extreme, the outcome of the market can be buyers-optimal, i.e., a
minimum competitive equilibrium where all items have the lowest possible prices to ensure market clearance
and utility maximization. Maximum and minimum equilibria represent the contradictory interests of the
two parties in a two-sided matching market at the two extremes; and, as shown by Shapley and Shubik [28],
both equilibria always exist and their prices are unique.
Using market equilibrium as a mechanism for computing prices and allocations yields desirable properties
of efficiency and fairness. The winners in the mechanism, however, will bid against the protocol to reduce
their payments; further, the losers may increase their bids to be more competitive (to their best interests).
The problem becomes an (n+1)-person game played in turn between the seller and the buyers where buyers
make strategic moves to (mis)report their bids for the items, in response to other buyers’ bids and the
solution selected by the market maker.
It is well-known that the minimum equilibrium mechanism admits a truthful dominant strategy for
every buyer [22, 8], resulting in a solution equivalent to the VCG protocol [30, 5, 15]. However, it is
hardly convincing a rational economic agent who dominates the market to make a move that maximizes the
collective returns of its buyers by sacrificing its own revenue. Clearly, the Nash equilibrium paradigm has
always assumed that an economic agent is a utility maximizer; for the market marker, it implies revenue
maximization. Further, success in bringing great revenue (in a short term) will bring a large number of
eyeballs and lead to positive externalities, which could breed more success (in a long term). Indeed, quite a
few successful designs, like the generalized second price auction for sponsored search markets [1] and the FCC
spectrum auction for licenses of electromagnetic spectra [6, 23], do not admit a truthful dominant strategy.
Our interest is to find out the properties of the game between the seller and the buyers (among which
they compete with each other for the items), especially with these two extremes of the solution concepts —
their relationship proves to be significant in the incentive analysis of the buyers in the market. In particular,
we are interested in the dynamics of the outcomes when the market maker adopts the maximum equilibrium
mechanism and the buyers adopt a particular type of strategy, that of the best response strategy. With the
best response strategy, a buyer would announce his bids for all items that would result in the maximum
utility for himself, under the fixed bids of other buyers and the maximum equilibrium mechanism prefixed
by the market maker. The best response strategy varies depending on the circumstances of the market and
has its nature place in the analysis of dynamics of strategic interplays of agents.
For the special case of single item markets where the market maker has only one item to sell, maximum
equilibrium corresponds to the first price auction protocol and minimum equilibrium corresponds to the
second price auction protocol. The first price auction sells the item to the buyer with the highest bid at
a price equal to his bid (i.e., the highest possible price so that everyone is happy with his corresponding
allocation). Under a dynamic setting, buyers take turns in making their moves in response to what they are
encountered in the previous round(s). In a simple setting when all buyers bid their true values initially, the
winner with the highest bid will immediately shade his bid down to the smallest value so that he is still a
1
winner. Such best response bidding of the winner results in an outcome equivalent to the Vickrey second
price auction, which charges the winner at the smallest possible price (i.e., the second highest bid) so that
everyone’s utility is maximized. The observation of convergence from the first price to the second price goes
hand-in-hand with the seminal revenue equivalence theory in Bayesian analysis [30, 26]. Therefore, both the
Bayesian model and the dynamic best response model point to the same unification result of the first price
and the second price solution concepts in the single item markets.
The story is hardly ending for the process of Nash dynamics with multiple items being sold in the market,
which illustrates a rich structure that a single item market does not possess. First of all, in a single item
market, the best response decision of a buyer is binary, that is, he decides either to or not to compete with
the highest bid of others for the item at a smallest cost. With multiple items, however, a buyer needs to
make his decision in the best response over all items rather than a single item. In particular, he may desire
any item in a subset — each of which brings him the same maximum utility — and lose interest for other
items. The buyer’s best response, therefore, is in accordance with his strategic bids for the items in both
subsets. For example, it is possible that one increases hid bid for one item but decreases for another in a best
response. This opens many possibilities that would complicate the analysis; in particular, best responses of
a buyer are not unique. Indeed, as Example 3.1 shows, not all best responses guarantee convergence, again
because of the multiplicity in possibilities of bidding strategies.
Second, in a single item market, the submitted bids of buyers illustrate a monotone property to the price
of the item. That is, when a buyer increases his bid, the price is always monotonically non-decreasing. With
multiple items, while it is true that the prices of the items are still monotone with respect to the bids of
the losers, counter-intuitively, the prices are no longer monotone with respect to the bids of the winners,
as the following Example 1.1 shows. This non-monotonicity further requires extra efforts to analyze the
multiplicity of best response strategies and their properties.
Example 1.1 (Non-monotonicity). There are three buyers i1, i2, i3 and two items j1, j2 with submitted bids
bi1j1 = 2, bi2j1 = 12, bi2j2 = 14 and bi3j2 = 5 (the bids of all unspecified pairs are zero). For the given
bid vector, (pj1 , pj2) = (3, 5) is the maximum equilibrium price vector, and assigning j1 to i2 and j2 to i3
are supported allocations. If a winner i2 increases his bid of j2 to b
′
i2j2
= 15, then (p′j1 , p
′
j2
) = (2, 5) is the
maximum equilibrium price vector (with the same allocations) where the price of j1 is decreased from 3 to 2.
Hence, the maximum equilibrium prices are not monotone with respect to the submitted bids (of the winners).
Finally, the maximum market equilibrium solution has no closed form as in the single item case, and
the convergence of the best responses depends on a careful choice of the bidding strategy. Recall that a
major difficulty in analyzing the best responses is that, in addition to bidding strategically for the items
that bring the maximum utility, buyers may have (almost arbitrarily) different bidding strategies for those
items that they are not interested in; these decisions indeed play a critical role to the convergence of the best
responses. As not all best responses necessarily lead to convergence (Example 3.1), we restrict to a specific
bidding strategy, called aligned best response, where a bid vector of a buyer is called aligned if any allocation
of an item with positive bid brings him the maximum utility. The aligned bidding strategy illustrates the
preference of a buyer over all items and is shown to be a best response (Lemma 3.1 and 3.2). While the
aligned best response still does not have a monotone property in general (see Figure 3), the prices do exhibit
a pattern of monotonicity when the bids of the buyers have already been aligned. Based on these properties,
we show that the aligned best response always converges and maximizes social welfare, summarized by the
following claim.
Theorem. In the maximum competitive equilibrium mechanism game, for any initial bid vector and any
ordering of the buyers, the aligned best response always converges. Further, the allocation at convergence
maximizes social welfare.
In addition to proving convergence, another important question is that which Nash equilibrium to which
the best response will converge. In contrast with single item markets where Nash equilibrium is essentially
unique, in multi-item markets there can be several Nash equilibria with completely irrelevant price vectors
(see Appendix D); this is another remarkable difference between single item and multi-item markets. Despite
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of the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, if we start with an aligned bid vector (e.g., bid truthfully), the best
response always converges to one at a minimum competitive equilibrium, i.e., a VCG outcome.
Theorem. Starting from an aligned bid vector, the aligned best response of the maximum equilibrium
mechanism converges to a minimum competitive equilibrium at truthful bidding.
1.1 Related Work and Motivation
The study of competitive equilibrium in a matching market was initiated by Shapley and Shubik in an
assignment model [28]. They showed that maximum and minimum competitive equilibria always exist and
gave a simple linear program to compute one. Their results were later improved to the models with general
utility functions [7, 13]. Leonard [22] and Demange and Gale [8] studied strategic behaviors in the market
and proved that the minimum equilibrium mechanism admits a truthful dominant strategy for every buyer.
Later, Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [9] gave an ascending auction based algorithm that converges to a
minimum equilibrium. Our study focuses on Nash dynamics in the matching market model; the convergence
from maximum equilibrium to minimum equilibrium implies revenue equivalence, and addresses the question
that why short-term revenue maximization is a poor long run strategy in a dynamic framework.
The Nash dynamics of best responses has its nature place in the analysis of interplays of strategic agents.
In general, characterizing equilibria of the dynamics is difficult or intractable. There have been extensive
studies in the literature for some special settings, e.g., potential games [25], congestion games [4], evolutionary
games [18], concave games [11], correlated equilibrium [17], sink equilibria [14], and market equilibrium [31],
to name a few. Complexity issues have also been addressed in the analysis of best responses [2, 12, 25].
Recently, Nisan et al. [27] independently considered best response dynamics in matching market and show
a similar convergence result for running first price auctions for all items individually. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first to study best response dynamics in the maximum competitive equilibrium
mechanism.
Despite the motivation is mainly from theoretical curiosity, our setting does capture some realistic ap-
plications, such as eBay electronic market and sponsored search market, which have attracted a lot research
efforts in recent years. The mechanism used in the sponsored search market is that of the generalized second
price (GSP) auction. Because GSP is not truthful in general, a number of studies have focused on strategic
considerations of advertisers. Edelman et al. [10] and Varian [29] independently showed that certain Nash
equilibrium in the GSP auction derives the same revenue as the well-known truthful VCG scheme. Cary et
al. [3] showed that a certain best response bidding strategy converges to the best Nash equilibrium. Recently,
Leme and Tardos [21] considered other possible Nash equilibrium outputs and showed that the ratio between
the worst and best Nash equilibria is upper bounded by 1.618. These results putting together illustrate a
pretty complete overview of the structure of strategic behaviors in GSP. Our results are not directly about
GSP but in a different way to reconfirm the revenue equivalence: While the search engine may adopt a
different protocol with the goal of revenue maximization (i.e., the maximum equilibrium mechanism), with
rational advertisers its overall revenue will eventually be the same as in the VCG protocol.
Another widely studied problem related to our model is that of spectrum markets. In designing the
FCC spectrum auction protocol, a multiple stage bidding process, proposed by Milgrom [23], to digest
coordination, optimization and withdrawal, is adopted. It is conducted in several stages to allow buyers to
change their bids when the seller announces the tentative prices of the licenses for the winners. Therefore,
it is created as an alternative game played between the seller and the buyers as a whole. Our best response
analysis considers the dynamic aspect of the model and illustrates the convergence of the dynamic process.
Organization. We will first describe our model and maximum/minimum competitive equilibrium (mech-
anism) in Section 2. In Section 3, we define the aligned bidding strategy and show that it is a best response
and always converges. In Section 4, we characterize Nash equilibria in the maximum equilibrium mechanism
game; and based on the characterization, we show that the maximum equilibrium mechanism converges to
a minimum equilibrium output. We conclude our discussions in Section 5.
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2 Preliminaries
We have a market with n unit-demand buyers, where each buyer wants at most one item, and m indivisible
items, where each item can be sold to at most one buyer. We will denote buyers by i and items by j
throughout the paper. For every buyer i and item j, there is a value vij ∈ [0,∞), representing the maximum
amount that i is willing to pay for item j. We will assume that there are m dummy buyers all with value
zero for each item j, i.e., vij = 0. This assumption is without loss of generality, and implies that the number
of items is always less than or equal to the number of buyers, i.e., m ≤ n.
The outcome of the market is a tuple (p,x), where
• p = (p1, . . . , pm) ≥ 0 is a price vector, where pj is the price charged for item j;
• x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an allocation vector, where xi is the item that i wins. If i does not win any items,
denote xi = ∅. Note that different buyers must win different items, i.e., xi 6= xi′ for any i 6= i′ if
xi, xi′ 6= ∅.
Given an output (p,x), let ui(p,x) denote the utility that i obtains. We will assume that all buyers have
quasi-linear utilities. That is, if i wins item j (i.e., xi = j), his utility is ui(p,x) = vij − pj; if i does not win
any item (i.e., xi = ∅), his utility is ui(p,x) = 0.
Buyers’ preferences over items are according to their utilities — higher utility items are more preferable.
We say that buyer i (strictly) prefers j to j′ if vij − pj > vij′ − pj′ , is indifferent between j and j
′ if
vij − pj = vij′ − pj′ , and weakly prefers j to j′ if vij − pj ≥ vij′ − pj′ . In particular, a utility of zero,
vij − pj = 0, means that i is indifferent between buying item j at price pj and not buying anything at all; a
negative utility vij − pj < 0 means that the buyer strictly prefers to not buy the item at price pj .
We consider the following solution concept in this paper.
Definition 2.1. (Competitive equilibrium) We say a tuple (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium if (i) for
any item j, pj = 0 if no one wins j in allocation x, and (ii) for any buyer i, his utility is maximized by his
allocation at the given price vector. That is,
• if i wins item j (i.e., xi = j), then vij − pj ≥ 0; and for every other item j′, vij − pj ≥ vij′ − pj′ ;
• if i does not win any item (i.e., xi = ∅), then for every item j, vij −pj ≤ 0. (For notational simplicity,
we write vi∅ − p∅ = 0.)
The first condition above is an efficiency condition (i.e., market clearance), which says that all unallocated
items are priced at zero (or at some given reserve price). The assumption that there is a dummy buyer for
each item allows us to assume, without loss of generality, that all items are allocated in an equilibrium. The
second is a fairness condition (i.e., envy-freeness), implying that each buyer is allocated with an item that
maximizes his utility at these prices. That is, if i wins item j, then i cannot obtain higher utility from any
other item; and if i does not win any item, then i cannot obtain a positive utility from any item. Namely,
all buyers are happy with their corresponding allocations at the given price vector.
For any given matching market, Shapley and Shubik [28] proved that there always is a competitive
equilibrium. Actually, what they showed was much stronger — there is the unique minimum (respectively,
maximum) equilibrium price vector, defined formally as follows.
Definition 2.2. (Minimum equilibrium min-eq and maximum equilibrium max-eq) A price vector p
is called a minimum equilibrium price vector if for any other equilibrium price vector q, pj ≤ qj for every
item j. An equilibrium (p,x) is called a minimum equilibrium (denoted by min-eq) if p is the minimum
equilibrium price vector. The maximum equilibrium price vector and a maximum equilibrium (denoted by
max-eq) are defined similarly.
For example, there are there buyers i1, i2, i3 and one item; the values of buyers are vi1 = 10, vi2 = 5 and
vi3 = 2. Then p = 5 and p = 10 are the minimum and maximum equilibrium prices, respectively. Allocating
the item to the first buyer i1, together with any price 5 ≤ p ≤ 10, yields a competitive equilibrium. When
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there is a single item, it can be seen that the outcome of the minimum equilibrium and the maximum
equilibrium corresponds precisely to the “second price auction” and the “first price auction”, respectively.
Consider another example: There are there buyers i1, i2, i3 and two items j1, j2; the values of buyers are
vi1j1 = 10, vi1j2 = 6, vi2j1 = 8, vi2j2 = 4, and vi3j1 = 3, vi3j2 = 2. Then (6, 2) is the minimum equilibrium
price vector and (8, 4) is the maximum equilibrium price vector. Note that the allocation vectors supported
by the minimum or maximum equilibrium price vector may not be unique. In this example, we can allocate
j1 and j2 arbitrarily to i1 and i2 to form an equilibrium. Indeed, as Gul and Stacchetti [16] showed, if both
p and q are equilibrium price vectors and (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium, then (q,x) is an equilibrium
as well.
2.1 Maximum Equilibrium Mechanism Game
In this paper, we will consider a maximum equilibrium as a mechanism, that is, every buyer i reports a bid bij
for each item j (note that bij can be different from his true value vij), and given reported bids from all buyers
b = (bij), the maximum equilibrium mechanism (again denoted by max-eq) outputs a maximum equilibrium
with respect to b. Let max-eq(b) denote the (maximum) equilibrium returned by the mechanism.
Let ui(b) denote the utility that i obtains in max-eq(b). That is, if (p,x) = max-eq(b), then ui(b) =
vixi −pxi if xi 6= ∅ and ui(b) = 0 if xi = ∅. Note that the (true) utility of every buyer is defined according to
his true valuations vij , rather than the bids bij ; and the “equilibrium” output (p,x) is computed in terms of
the bid vector b, rather than the true valuations (i.e., it is only guaranteed that bixi − pxi ≥ bij − pj for any
item j). Therefore, the true utility of a buyer i might not be maximized at the corresponding allocation xi
and the given price vector p. Further, the output (p,x) = max-eq(b) might not even be a real equilibrium
with respect to the true valuations of the buyers.
Considering competitive equilibria as mechanisms defines a multi-parameter setting and it is natural
to consider strategic behaviors of the buyers. While it is a dominant strategy for every buyer to report
his true valuations in the minimum equilibrium mechanism (i.e., the mechanism outputs a min-eq for the
given bid vector) [8], the max-eq mechanism does not in general admit a dominant strategy. This is
true even for the degenerated single item case — it is well-known that the first price auction is not incentive
compatible. Therefore, in the max-eqmechanism, buyers will behave strategically to maximize their utilities.
In particular, fixing bids of other buyers, buyer i will naturally place his bid vector (bij)j to maximize his
own utility; such a vector is called a best response. The focus of the present paper is to consider convergence
of best response dynamics, i.e., buyers iteratively change their bids according to best responses while all the
others remain their previous bids unchanged. We say a best response dynamics converges if it eventually
reaches a state where no buyer is willing to change his bid anymore; hence, it arrives at a Nash equilibrium.
As our focus is on the convergence of best response dynamics, we discretize the bidding space of every
buyer to be a multiple of a given arbitrarily small constant ǫ > 0, and assume that all vij ’s and bij ’s are
multiples of ǫ. In practice, ǫ can be, e.g., one cent or one dollar (or any other unit number). This assumption
is natural in the context of two-sided markets with money transfers, and implies that if a buyer increases his
bid for an item, it must be by at least ǫ. In addition, we assume that the bid that every buyer submits for
every item is less than or equal to his true valuation, i.e., bij ≤ vij . This assumption is rather mild because
(i) bidding higher than the true valuations carries the risk of a negative utility, and (ii) as Lemma 3.1 and
3.2 below show, for any given fixed bids of other buyers, there always is a best response strategy for every
buyer to bid less than or equal to his true valuations.
2.2 Computation of Maximum Equilibrium
Shapley and Shubik [28] gave a linear program to compute a min-eq; their approach can be easily transformed
to compute a max-eq by changing the objective to maximize the total payment. Next we give a combinatorial
algorithm to iteratively increase prices to converge to a max-eq. The idea of the algorithm is important to
our analysis in the subsequent sections.
Definition 2.3 (Demand graph). Given any given bid vector b and price vector p, its demand graph
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G(b,p) = (A,B;E) is defined as follows: A is the set of buyers and B is the set of items, and (i, j) ∈ E if
bij ≥ pj and bij − pj ≥ bij′ − pj′ for any j′.
In a demand graph G(b,p), every edge (i, j) represents that item j gives maximal utility to buyer i, pre-
sumed that his true valuations are given by b. Note that demand graph is uniquely determined by the given
bid vector and price vector, and is independent to any allocation vector. However, an equilibrium allocation
must be selected from the set of edges in the demand graph. The following definition of alternating paths in
the demand graph is crucial to our analysis. (Recall that all items are allocated out in an equilibrium.)
Definition 2.4. (max-alternating path) Given any equilibrium (p,x) of a given bid b, let G = G(b,p)
be its demand graph. For any item j, a path (j = j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ) in graph G is called a max-
alternating path if edges are in and not in the allocation x alternatively, i.e., xik = jk for all k = 1, . . . , ℓ.
Denote by Gmaxj (b,p,x) (or simply G
max
j when the parameters are clear from the context) the subgraph of
G(b,p) (containing both buyers and items including j itself) reachable from j through max-alternating paths
with respect to x. A max-alternating path (j = j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ) in G
max
j (b,p,x) is called critical if
biℓjℓ = pjℓ .
For any given bid vector b, let (p,x) be an arbitrary equilibrium. Note that for any buyer i with xi 6= ∅,
(i, xi) is an edge in the demand graph G(b,p). We consider the following recursive rule to increase prices:
For any item j, increase prices of all items in Gmaxj continuously with the same amount until one of the
following events occurs:
1. There is buyer i ∈ Gmaxj such that bixi = pxi (note that xi ∈ G
max
j );
2. There is buyer i ∈ Gmaxj and item j
′ /∈ Gmaxj such that i obtains maximal utility from j
′ as well; then
we add edge (i, j′) to the demand graph and update Gmaxj for each j.
The process continues iteratively until we cannot increase the price for any item. Denote the algorithm by
Alg-max-eq. We have the following result.
Theorem 2.1. Starting from an arbitrary equilibrium (p,x) for the given bid vector b, let q be the final
price vector in the above price-increment process Alg-max-eq. Together with the original allocation vector
x, (q,x) is a max-eq with respect to b.
The above algorithm Alg-max-eq and theorem illustrate the idea of defining Gmaxj (and the correspond-
ing max-alternating paths), summarized in the following corollary. (Note that if (j = j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ)
is a critical max-alternating path in Gmaxj (b,p,x), then the last pair (iℓ, jℓ) where biℓjℓ = pjℓ is the exact
reason that why we are not able to increase the price pj further in the Alg-max-eq to derive a higher
equilibrium price vector.)
Corollary 2.1. Given any bid vector b and (p,x) = max-eq(b), for any item j, there is a critical max-
alternating path in the subgraph Gmaxj (b,p,x).
3 Best Response Dynamics
For any given bid vector b, assume that the max-eq outputs (p,x), i.e., (p,x) = max-eq(b). If (p,x) is
not a Nash equilibrium, there is a buyer who is able to obtain more utility by unilaterally changing his bid.
Such a buyer will therefore naturally choose a vector (called a best response) to bid so that his utility is
maximized in the max-eq mechanism, given fixed bids of all other buyers.
Consider the following example: There are three buyers i1, i2, i3 and two items j1, j2, with bi1j1 = vi1j1 =
20, bi1j2 = vi1j2 = 18, and bi2j1 = bi2j2 = bi3j1 = bi3j2 = 10. Then p = (12, 10) is the maximum equilibrium
price and i1 obtains utility 8. Consider a scenario where i1 changes his bid to b
′
i1j1
= b′i1j2 = 15; then the
maximum equilibrium price vector becomes p′ = (10, 10). Given the equilibrium price vector p′, however,
there are two different equilibrium allocations which give him different true utilities (where i1 either wins j1
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with utility vi1j1 − p
′
j1
= 10 or wins j2 with utility vi1j2 − p
′
j2
= 8). Hence, different selections of equilibrium
allocations may lead to different true utilities, which in turn will certainly affect best response strategies of
the buyers.
To analyze the best responses of the buyers, it is therefore necessary to specify a framework about their
belief on the resulting equilibrium allocations. We will consider worst case analysis in this paper, i.e., all
buyers are risk-averse and always assume the worst possible allocations when making their best responses1.
The above bid vector b′i1j1 = b
′
i1j2
= 15, therefore, is not a best response for i1 since his utility in the worst
allocation is only 8. In the worse-case analysis framework, the best responses of i1 in the above example are
given by b′i1j1 = 10 + ǫ and b
′
i1j2
≤ 10 where i1 wins j1 at price 10 + ǫ with utility vi1j1 − (10 + ǫ) = 10 − ǫ
(it can be seen that there is no bid vector such that i1 can obtain a utility higher than or equal to 10 given
fixed bids of the other two buyers)2.
The above example further shows that best response strategies may not be unique: While i1 always
wants to bid 10+ ǫ for j1, he can bid any value between 0 and 10 for j2 to constitute a best response. While
the bids for those items in which a buyer is not interested (i.e., j2 in the above example) will not affect the
utility that the buyer obtains after his best response bidding, they do affect the overall convergence of the
best response dynamics, as the following example shows.
vi1j1 = 100
vi2j1 = 5
vi2j2 = 2
i2
i1
j2
j1
bi1j1 = 100
bi2j1 = 5
bi2j2 = 2
2
100
bi1j1 = 100
bi2j1 = 0
bi2j2 = ǫ
ǫ
100
bi1j1 = ǫ
bi2j1 = 0
bi2j2 = ǫ
ǫ
ǫ
bi1j1 = ǫ
bi2j1 = 2ǫ
bi2j2 = 0
0
2ǫ
bi1j1 = 3ǫ
bi2j1 = 2ǫ
bi2j2 = 0
0
3ǫ
bi1j1 = 3
bi2j1 = 3− ǫ
bi2j2 = 0
0
3
bi1j1 = 3
bi2j1 = 0
bi2j2 = ǫ
ǫ
3
Figure 1: A best response that does not converge.
Example 3.1. (Non-convergence of a best response) There are two buyers i1, i2 and two items j1, j2,
where vi1j1 = 100, vi1j2 = 0, vi2j1 = 5 and vi2j2 = 2. (There still are dummy buyers; we do not describe them
explicitly.) Consider the following specific best response strategy: Every buyer in the best response always
bids zero to those items that he is not interested in. Since vi1j2 = 0, we assume that i1 always bids zero to
j2. The process in Figure 1 shows that the best response dynamics does not converge. (For all examples in
the paper, the black vertices on the left denote the buyers who change their bids in the best response, the solid
lines denote allocations, and the numbers along with item vertices denote the maximum equilibrium prices.)
3.1 Best Response Strategy
Given the non-convergence of a specific best response shown in Example 3.1, one would ask if there are
any best response strategies that always converge for any given instance. We consider the following bidding
strategy.
1When buyers report the same bids on some items, a certain tie-breaking rule should be specified to decide an equilibrium
allocation. In the literature, ties are broken either by an oracle access to the true valuations or by a given fixed order of
buyers [19, 20]. In our worst-case analysis framework, we actually do not need to specify a tie-breaking rule explicitly. It
essentially implies that (i) a buyer who changes his bid has the lowest priority in tie-breaking, and (ii) any buyer who bids zero
cannot win the corresponding item at price zero due to the existence of dummy buyers (i.e., there is no free lunch).
2For any fixed bids of other buyers, the utility that a risk-averse buyer obtains in a best response is always within a distance
of ǫ to that in a best possible allocation that a risk-seeking buyer may obtain. Thus, the worst case analysis (i.e., with risk-averse
buyers) does provide a “safe” equilibrium allocation in which the corresponding utility is almost the same as the maximal.
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Lemma 3.1. (Best response of losers) For any given bid vector b, let (p,x) = max-eq(b). Given
fixed bids of other buyers, consider any buyer i0 with xi0 = ∅; let di0 = maxj vi0j − pj.
• If di0 ≤ 0, a best response of i0 is to bid the same vector (bi0j)j.
• Otherwise, a best response of i0 is given by vector (b′i0j)j, where b
′
i0j
= max{0, vi0j − di0 + ǫ}. Further,
the utility that i0 obtains after the best response bidding is either di0 or di0 − ǫ.
3
Lemma 3.2. (Best response of winners) For any given bid vector b, let (p,x) = max-eq(b). Given
fixed bids of other buyers, consider any buyer i0 with xi0 6= ∅. Denote by b 6∋i0 the bid vector derived from b
where i0 changes his bid to 0 for all items. Let (q,y) = max-eq(b 6∋i0) and di0 = maxj vi0j − qj.
• If di0 ≤ 0 or ui0(p,x) = di0 , a best response of i0 is to bid the same vector (bi0j)j.
• Otherwise, a best response of i0 is given by vector (b′i0j)j, where b
′
i0j
= max{0, vi0j − di0 + ǫ}. Further,
the utility that i0 obtains after the best response bidding is either di0 or di0 − ǫ.
4
The best response (b′i0j)j defined in the above two lemmas has two remarkable properties: First, if
vi0j ≥ vi0j′ then b
′
i0j
≥ b′i0j′ ; second, if b
′
ij , b
′
ij′ > 0 then vi0j − b
′
i0j
= vi0j′ − b
′
i0j′
. Hence, the best response
(b′i0j)j captures the preference of i0 over all items. In addition, given fixed bids of other buyers, the difference
vi0j − b
′
i0j
gives the maximal possible utility (up to a gap of ǫ) that i0 is able to obtain from item j.
We say a bid vector (bij)j aligned if for any bij , bij′ > 0, vij − bij = vij′ − bij′ . That is, (bij)j is derived
from (vij)j by moving the curve down in parallel capped at 0. It can be seen that the bid vectors defined
in the above Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 are aligned. Hence, we will refer such bidding strategy by aligned
best response. In the following, unless stated otherwise, all best responses are aligned according to these
two lemmas. The following Figure 2 shows the convergence of Example 3.1 according to the aligned best
response when both buyers bid their true values initially (as in Figure 1).
bi1j1 = 100
bi2j1 = 5
bi2j2 = 2
2
100
bi1j1 = 100
bi2j1 = 3 + ǫ
bi2j2 = ǫ
ǫ
100
bi1j1 = 3 + ǫ
bi2j1 = 3 + ǫ
bi2j2 = ǫ
ǫ
3 + ǫ
Figure 2: Convergence of Example 3.1 by the aligned best response.
vi1j1 = 3
vi2j1 = 10
vi2j2 = 10
vi3j2 = 2i3
i2
i1
j2
j1
bi1j1 = 3
bi2j1 = 3
bi2j2 = 2
bi3j2 = 2
2
3
bi1j1 = 3
bi2j1 = 2 + ǫ
bi2j2 = 2 + ǫ
bi3j2 = 2
2 + ǫ
3
bi1j1 = 2 + ǫ
bi2j1 = 2 + ǫ
bi2j2 = 2 + ǫ
bi3j2 = 2
2 + ǫ
2 + ǫ
Figure 3: Non-monotonicity of the aligned best response.
3Note that if di0 > ǫ, then certainly i0 improves his utility through the best response bidding. If di0 = ǫ, however, it is
possible that i0 obtains the same utility di0 − ǫ = 0 = ui0 (p,x) after the best response bidding. For such a case, (b
′
i0j
)j is
still a best response and we assume that i0 will continue to change his bid according to it. This assumption is without loss
of generality as our focus is on the convergence of the best response strategy. Further, in practice, buyers usually do not have
complete information about the market (e.g., bid vectors of others) and are unaware of the exact utility they will obtain if
change their bids. Hence, continuing to bid the best response provides a safe strategy for the buyers to maximize their utilities.
4Similar to the discussions for Lemma 3.1, if ui0 (p,x) < di0 − ǫ, then i0 strictly improves his utility after the best response
bidding; if ui0 (p,x) = di0 − ǫ, it is possible that i0 obtains the same utility di0 − ǫ after the best response bidding. Again for
such a case, (b′i0j)j is still a best response and we assume that i0 will continue change his bid according to it.
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3.2 Properties of the Best Response
Example 1.1 shows that maximum equilibrium prices may not be monotone with respect to the submitted
bid vectors. Such non-monotonicity still occurs even for the aligned best response of the winners defined in
Lemma 3.2. In the example of the Figure 3, when a winner i2 changes his bid, the price of j2 is increased from
2 to 2 + ǫ in the maximum equilibrium. Hence, the maximum equilibrium prices may not be monotonically
decreasing with respect to the aligned best responses of the winners.
However, as the following claim shows, we do have monotonicity for the maximum equilibrium prices
given a certain condition. This property is crucial in the analysis of convergence.
Lemma 3.3. When a loser makes a best response bidding (by Lemma 3.1), the maximum equilibrium prices
will not decrease. On the other hand, when a winner, who has already made at least one aligned best response
bidding, makes a best response bidding (by Lemma 3.2), the maximum equilibrium prices will not increase.
We have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Given a bid vector b and (p,x) = max-eq(b), any loser i0 is willing to make a best response
bidding only if there is an item j such that vi0j > pj. For any winner i0 who has already made a best response
bidding, the following claims hold:
• i0 is willing to make a best response bidding b′ only if the price of item xi0 will decrease in max-eq(b 6∋i0)
(defined in Lemma 3.2).
• Let (q,y) = max-eq(b 6∋i0) and (p
′,x′) = max-eq(b′), then (p′,x) is a max-eq for b′ as well. Hence,
we can assume without loss of generality that when i0 places a best response bidding, the allocation
remains the same.
3.3 Convergence of the Best Response Dynamics
In this subsection we will show that the aligned best response defined in Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 always converges.
In the rest of this subsection we will assume that all buyers have already made a best response bidding; this
assumption is without loss of generality since our goal is to prove convergence. Hence, the results established
in the last subsection can be applied directly.
Proposition 3.1. Given a bid vector b and (p,x) = max-eq(b), assume that a winner i0 first makes a
best response bidding.
• If next another winner i′0 makes a best response bidding, then i0 will not change his bid in the best
response.
• If next a loser i′0 makes a best response bidding, then as long as i0 is still a winner after i
′
0’s bid, he
will not change his bid in the best response.
Similar to Proposition 3.1, we have the following claim for the best response of losers.
Proposition 3.2. Given a bid vector b and (p,x) = max-eq(b), assume that a loser i0 first makes a best
response bidding and becomes a winner.
• If next another winner i′0 makes a best response bidding, then i0 will not change his bid in the best
response.
• If next another loser i′0 makes a best response bidding, then as long as i0 is still a winner after i
′
0’s bid,
he will not change his bid in the best response.
The above two propositions imply the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Given a bid vector b and (p,x) = max-eq(b),
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• if a winner i0 makes a best response bidding, then unless i0 becomes a loser (due to the best responses
of others), he will not change his bid in the best response;
• if a loser i0 makes a best response bidding and becomes a winner, then unless i0 becomes a loser again
(due to the best responses of others), he will not change his bid in the best response.
We are now ready to prove our main theorem.
Theorem 3.1. In the maximum competitive equilibrium mechanism game, for any given initial bid vector
and any ordering of the buyers, the aligned best response defined in Lemma 3.1 and 3.2 always converges.
Proof. By Corollary 3.2, after all buyers have already made a best response bidding, only losers are willing to
make best responses to become a winner and winners are willing to make best responses only if they become
a loser. By Lemma 3.3, the prices will be monotonically non-decreasing when losers make best responses.
Hence, the process eventually terminates.
The above theorem only says that the aligned best response is guaranteed to converge in finite steps;
indeed it may take a polynomial of maxij vij/ǫ steps to converge. This is true even for the simplest setting
with one item and two buyers of the same value v1 = v2: The two buyers with initial bids zero keep
increasing their bids by 2ǫ one by one to beat each other until the price reaches to v1 = v2. However, in most
applications like advertising markets, the value of maxij vij is rather small. Further, to guarantee efficient
convergence, we may set ǫ to be sufficiently large so that the rally between the winners and losers is fast
(e.g., in most ascending auctions, the minimum increment of a bid is scaled according to the expected value
of maxij vij).
4 Characterization of Nash Dynamics: From max-eq to min-eq
Theorem 3.1 in the previous section shows that the aligned best response always converges for any given
initial bid vector. However, it does not answer the questions of at which condition(s) the dynamics of the
best response stops (i.e., reaches to a stable state), and how the stable state looks like. We will answer these
questions in this section.
Theorem 4.1. For any Nash equilibrium bid vector b of the max-eq mechanism, let (p,x) = min-eq(b)
and (q,y) = max-eq(b). Then for any item j, we have either pj = qj or pj + ǫ = qj. That is, the max-eq
and min-eq price vectors differ by at most ǫ, i.e., max-eq(b) ≈ min-eq(b).
The above characterizations apply to all Nash equilibria in the max-eq mechanism, and gives a necessary
condition that when a bid vector forms a Nash equilibrium. Note that the other direction of the claim does
not hold. For example, there are one item and two buyers with the same true value v1 = v2 = 10. In the
bid vector b with b1 = b2 = 5, we have max-eq(b) = min-eq(b). However, b is not a Nash equilibrium as
the loser in the max-eq(b) can increase his bid to win the item.
In general, there can be multiple Nash equilibria for a given market. To compare different Nash equilibria,
we use a universal benchmark — the solution given by the truthful min-eq mechanism, i.e., (p∗,x∗) =
min-eq(v), where v is the true valuation vector. This is equivalent to the outcome of the second price
auction in single item markets and the VCG mechanism for the general multi-item markets. In Appendix D,
we give two examples to show that, for a given Nash equilibrium b with (p,x) = max-eq(b), there could
be no fixed relation between the price vectors p and p∗, i.e., it can be either p ≫ p∗ or p ≪ p∗. This is a
remarkable difference between single item and multi-item markets — in the former we always have p ≈ p∗
(i.e., ||p− p∗|| ≤ ǫ).
However, if we initially start with an aligned bid vector for all buyers (e.g., bid truthfully), then there is a
strong connection between the max-eq price vector at a converged Nash equilibrium and (p∗,x∗): The two
price vectors are “almost” identical, up to a gap of ǫ. We summarize our results in the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.2. For any Nash equilibrium bid vector b converged from the aligned best response, starting
from an aligned bid vector for all buyers, let (p,x) = max-eq(b) and (p∗,x∗) = min-eq(v), where v = (vij)
is the true valuation vector. Then we have
• either pj = p∗j or pj = p
∗
j + ǫ for all items;
• max-eq(b) ≈ min-eq(b) ≈ min-eq(v).
We comment that if we start with an arbitrary bid vector, as long as all buyers bid at least one aligned
best response in the dynamics, the convergence result from max-eq to min-eq still holds. In particular, this
includes the case when all buyers bid very low at the beginning. In addition, for any given bid vector b, if
the max-eq mechanism outputs max-eq(b) = min-eq(v), it is not necessary that b is a Nash equilibrium.
For example, it is possible that the bids of losers are quite small and therefore winners still want to decrease
their bids to pay less.
Finally, we characterize allocations at all Nash equilibria. We say an allocation x efficient if
∑
i vixi is
maximized, i.e., social welfare is maximized. It is well-known that all allocations in competitive equilibria
are efficient at truthful bidding. This can be easily generalized to say that for any given bid vector b,
any equilibrium allocation x maximizes
∑
i bixi . We have the following result, which says that any Nash
equilibrium converged from the aligned best response actually maximizes the real social welfare with respect
to v.
Theorem 4.3. For any Nash equilibrium bid vector b of the max-eq mechanism converged from the aligned
best response (starting from an arbitrary bid vector), let (p,x) = max-eq(b). Then x is an efficient allocation
that maximizes social welfare.
We note that the above claim does not hold for general Nash equilibria. For example, buyers i1 and i2
are interested in item j1 at values vi1j1 = v and vi2j1 = v + ǫ. Then allocating the item to i1 at price v is a
Nash equilibrium for the bid vector bi1j1 = bi2j1 = v (since the second buyer i2 still obtains a non-positive
utility even if he can win the item at a higher bid). This allocation does not maximize social welfare, and
the example can be easily generalized to arbitrary number of items with large deficiency. In the aligned best
response bidding, however, i2 will continue to bid v + ǫ to win the item by Lemma 3.1, which leads to an
efficient allocation.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of best responses of the maximum competitive equilibrium mechanism
in a matching market. While a best response strategy may not necessarily converge, we show that a specific
bidding strategy, aligned best response, always converges to a Nash equilibrium. The outcome at such a Nash
equilibrium is actually a minimum equilibrium given truthful bidding if we start with an aligned bid vector.
In other words, our results show that maximum equilibrium converges to minimum equilibrium, which is
a reminiscence of the convergence of dynamic bidding from first price auction to second price auction in a
single item market.
In our discussions, we assume that all buyers have complete information for the market, including, say,
submitted bid vectors of others, market prices and their corresponding allocation. We note that the first
one, submitted bids of other buyers, in not necessary in the dynamics: The best response of losers defined in
Lemma 3.1 applies automatically, and the best response of winners defined in Lemma 3.2 can be implemented
by a two-step strategy without requiring extra information in the market.
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A Proof of Theorem 2.1
Lemma A.1. Let (p,x) and (p′,x′) be any two equilibria for the given bid vector b. Let T = {j | pj < p′j}
and S = {i | x′i ∈ T } be the subset of buyers who win items in T in the equilibrium (p
′,x′). Then all buyers
in S win all items in T in the equilibrium (p,x) as well. In particular, this implies that if j is allocated to
a dummy buyer in (p,x) (i.e., essentially no one wins j), then its price is zero in all equilibria.
Proof. Note that since p′j > pj ≥ 0 for any j ∈ T , all items in T must be sold out in equilibrium (p
′,x′);
hence, |S| = |T | and all buyers in S win all items in T in (p′,x′). Consider any buyer i ∈ S, let j′ = x′i ∈ T .
For any item j /∈ T , since pj ≥ p′j , we have
bij′ − pj′ > bij′ − p
′
j′ ≥ bij − p
′
j ≥ bij − pj
where the second inequality follows from the fact that (x′,p′) is an equilibrium. Hence, buyer i always strictly
prefers item j′ to all other items not in T at price vector p, which implies that his allocation xi ∈ T .
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By the rule of increasing prices, since the initial (p,x) is an equilibrium, all buyers
are always satisfied with their respective allocations in the course of the algorithm. Further, it can be seen
that any item that is allocated to a dummy buyer (i.e., it has initial price pj = 0) will never have its price
increased. Hence, the final output (q,x) is an equilibrium as well.
Assume that (x∗,q∗) is a max-eq for the given bid vector b; we know that qj ≤ q∗j for all items. Let
T = {j | qj < q∗j } and S = {i | x
∗
i ∈ T } be the subset of buyers who win items in T in the max-eq
equilibrium. By Lemma A.1, we know that all buyers in S win all items in T in equilibrium (q,x) as well.
Assume that T 6= ∅; and consider any j1 ∈ T and the subgraph G
max
j1
(b,q,x) reachable from j1 in the
demand graph of the final output (q,x).
We claim that all items in Gmaxj1 are in T . Otherwise, consider an item jℓ ∈ G
max
j1
\ T and the max-
alternating path (j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , iℓ−1, jℓ) defining jℓ to be in G
max
j1
. Assume without loss of generality that
jℓ is the first item on the path which is not in T , i.e., jℓ−1 ∈ T and jℓ /∈ T . since jℓ−1 = xiℓ−1 ∈ T , by
Lemma A.1, we have j∗ , x∗iℓ−1 ∈ T . Hence,
biℓ−1jℓ − q
∗
jℓ
≥ biℓ−1jℓ − qjℓ
= biℓ−1jℓ−1 − qjℓ−1
≥ biℓ−1j∗ − qj∗
> biℓ−1j∗ − q
∗
j∗
which contradicts to the fact that iℓ−1 obtains his utility-maximized item in the max-eq.
Since all items in Gmaxj1 have their prices increased, again by Lemma A.1, all items in G
max
j1
are sold out.
Therefore, at the end of the algorithm when reaching to (q,x), we should still be able to increase prices for
items in Gmaxj1 , which is a contradiction. That is, T = ∅ and (q,x) is a max-eq. 
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B Proofs in Section 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Given fixed bids of other buyers, consider any bid vector (b∗i0j)j of buyer i0. Denote the resulting
bid vector by b∗, and let (p∗,x∗) = max-eq(b∗). A basic observation is that no matter what bid that i0
submits, everyone other than i0 is still happy with the original equilibrium (p,x). Hence, if b
∗
i0j
≤ pj for
any j, then (p,x) is still a max-eq for b∗. Otherwise, let j1 ∈ argmaxj{b
∗
i0j
− pj}. Consider subgraph
Gmaxj1 (b,p,x) and its critical max-alternating path (j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ) with respect to x, where xik = jk
for k = 1, . . . , ℓ−1 and the pair iℓ and jℓ is the reason that pj1 cannot be increased in (p,x) by the algorithm
(i.e., biℓjℓ = pjℓ). Consider reallocating each jk to ik−1 for k = 2, . . . , ℓ. By the definition of max-alternating
path, we know that all these buyers are still happy with their new allocations. Further, we reallocate j1 to
i0; then i0 obtains his utility-maximized item at price p under bid vector b
∗. This new allocation, together
with the price vector p, constitutes an equilibrium. In both cases, p is an equilibrium price vector under bid
vector b∗. Hence, the price of every item in max-eq(b∗) is larger than or equal to pj , i.e., p
∗
j ≥ pj .
We next analyze the best response of i0 defined in the statement of the claim. If vi0j ≤ pj for any j, then
i0 cannot get a positive utility from any item at price vector p, as well as p
∗. Hence, bidding the original
(losing) price vector is a best response strategy. It suffices to consider there is an item j such that vi0j > pj
and the best response strategy (b′i0j)j described in the second part of the statement (denoted by b
′).
Let T = {j | vi0j − pj = di0}; by the assumption, T 6= ∅. It can be seen that for any j ∈ T , b
′
ij − pj = ǫ;
and any j /∈ T , b′ij − pj ≤ vi0j − di0 + ǫ− pj < di0 − di0 + ǫ = ǫ, i.e., b
′
ij − pj ≤ 0. That is, given bid vector b
′
and price vector p, i0 always desires those items in T . Consider any item j0 ∈ T , by the same reassignment
argument described above, we can reallocate j0 to i0, as well as a few other reallocations through a critical
max-alternating path, to derive an equilibrium (p,x′), where x′ is the corresponding new allocation. Note
that (p,x′) may not be a max-eq. Consider subgraph Gmaxj0 (b
′,p,x′); we ask whether pj0 can be increased
further by the algorithm Alg-max-eq to get a max-eq.
If the answer is ‘no’, then (p,x′) is indeed a max-eq under bid vector b′ (it can be shown that the price
of any other item cannot be increased as well), and the utility that i0 obtains satisfies
ui0(p,x
′) = vi0j0 − pj0 = di0
= max
j
vi0j − pj ≥ max
j
vi0j − p
∗
j ≥ ui0(p
∗,x∗)
If the answer is ‘yes’, then we can increase prices of all items in Gmaxj0 (b
′,p,x′) by ǫ, which gives an
equilibrium (p′,x′), where p′j = pj + ǫ if j ∈ G
max
j0
(b′,p,x′) and p′j = pj otherwise. Further, (p
′,x′) is a
max-eq under bid vector b′ since the price of j0 is tight with the bid of i0, i.e., b
′
i0j0
= p′j0 (again, prices of
other items cannot be increased). Hence, the utility that i0 obtains is
ui0(p
′,x′) = vi0j0 − p
′
j0
= vi0j0 − pj0 − ǫ = di0 − ǫ
Next we consider the utility that i0 obtains in the equilibrium (p
∗,x∗) with bid vector b∗. Note that all
other buyers bid the same values in b,b′ and b∗. Let j1 , x
∗
i0
; then
ui0(p
∗,x∗) = vi0j1 − p
∗
j1
≤ vi0j1 − pj1 ≤ di0
If one of the above inequalities is strict, then ui0(p
∗,x∗) < di0 . That is, ui0(p
∗,x∗) ≤ di0 − ǫ = ui0(p
′,x′),
which implies that b′ is a best response strategy. It remains to consider the case when all inequalities are
tight, i.e., ui0(p
∗,x∗) = di0 and p
∗
j1
= pj1 ; in this case, we have j1 ∈ T . Consider the following two cases
regarding the relation between j0 and j1.
• If j0 = j1, consider the subgraph Gmaxj1 (b
∗,p∗,x∗). Since the price of j1 cannot be increased, there is
a critical max-alternating path inside P = (j1, i1 = i0, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ) where x
∗
ik
= jk and b
∗
iℓjℓ
= p∗jℓ .
Since
b∗i0j2 − p
∗
j2
= b∗i0j1 − p
∗
j1
= b∗i0j1 − pj1
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we know that j2 ∈ T and p∗j2 = pj2 (otherwise, vi0j2 −p
∗
j2
< di0 , then in the worst allocation the utility
of i0 is less than di0). We claim that all items in P have p
∗
j = pj . Otherwise, consider the first item jk
where p∗jk > pjk . Note that k ≥ 3; then we have
b′ik−1jk−1 − pjk−1 = b
∗
ik−1jk−1
− p∗jk−1
= b∗ik−1jk − p
∗
jk
< b∗ik−1jk − pjk
= b′ik−1jk − pjk
Hence, x′ik−1 ∈ T
∗ , {j | p∗j > pj} and x
∗
ik−1
= jk−1 /∈ T ∗. This implies that there must be a buyer i
such that x′i /∈ T
∗ and x∗i ∈ T
∗, which is impossible since i does not get his utility-maximized item in
(p,x′). Therefore, essentially P defines a critical max-alternating path in Gmaxj0 (b
′,p,x′).
• If j0 6= j1, starting from P
′ = (j0, i0, j1), we expand the path P
′ through the following rule: if the
current last edge is (ik, jk+1), expand (jk+1, ik+1) if x
′
ik+1
= jk+1; if the current last edge is (jk, ik),
expand (ik, jk+1) if x
∗
ik
= jk+1. The process stops when there is no more item or buyer to expand;
denote the final path by P ′ = (j0, i0, j1, i
′
1, j
′
2, i
′
2, . . . , jℓ, i
′
ℓ). Note that edges in P
′ are in x′ and x∗
alternatively. Further, since i′1 wins j1 in x
′ and j′2 in x
∗, plus the fact that p∗j1 = pj1 , we have p
∗
j′
2
= pj′
2
;
then since i′2 wins j
′
2 in x
′ and j′3 in x
∗, we have p∗j′
3
= pj′
3
; the argument inductively implies that for
every item j ∈ P ′, p∗j = pj . At the end of path P
′, i′ℓ does not win any item in x
∗, which implies that
b′i′
ℓ
j′
ℓ
= pj′
ℓ
. If we consider path P ′ in Gmaxj0 (b
′,p,x′), the above arguments show that it is actually a
critical max-alternating path.
Hence, in both cases we cannot increase price pj0 in the equilibrium (p,x
′), which contradicts to our as-
sumption that the answer is ‘yes’.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. Given fixed bids of other buyers, consider any bid vector (b∗i0j)j of buyer i0. Denote the resulting bid
vector by b∗, and let (p∗,x∗) = max-eq(b∗). Consider the two equilibria (q,y) and (p∗,x∗) in the following
virtual scenario: i0 first bids 0 and loses in the max-eq (q,y) and then bids according to b
∗ yielding a new
max-eq (p∗,x∗). By a similar argument as the proof of the above lemma, we know that qj ≤ p∗j for all
items. In particular, the argument applies to the case when b∗ = b, hence qj ≤ pj .
Since the bid of any buyer is always less than or equal to his true value, we have
ui0(p,x) = vi0xi0 − pxi0 ≥ bi0xi0 − pxi0 ≥ 0
If ui0(p,x) = di0 , then certainly i0 cannot obtain more utility when bidding b
∗ since
ui0(p
∗,x∗) = vi0x∗i0
− p∗x∗
i0
≤ vi0x∗i0
− qx∗
i0
≤ di0 = ui0(p,x)
If di0 ≤ 0, then
vi0xi0 − pxi0 ≤ vi0xi0 − qxi0 ≤ 0
and
ui0(p
∗,x∗) = vi0x∗i0
− p∗x∗
i0
≤ vi0x∗i0
− qx∗
i0
≤ 0
Hence, ui0(p,x) = 0 ≥ ui0(p
∗,x∗), which implies that bidding the original vector (bi0j)j is a best response
strategy.
It remains to consider di0 > ui0(p,x) ≥ 0 and analyze the best response (b
′
i0j
)j , denote by b
′, defined
in the statement of the claim. Consider a virtual scenario where i0 first bids 0 and loses in the equilibrium
(q,y). By the above Lemma 3.1 for loser’s best response, we know that b′ is a best response strategy for i0
in the virtual scenario and ui0(b
′) ≥ di0 − ǫ ≥ ui0(p,x). Since bidding according to b
∗ is a specific strategy
for i0, we have ui0(b
′) ≥ ui0(p
∗,x∗). These two inequalities together imply that bidding according to b′ is
a best response strategy for i0.
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. The first part of the claim follows directly from the proof of Lemma 3.1, thus we will only prove the
second part. Consider bid vector b and equilibrium (p,x) = max-eq(b), bid vector b 6∋i0 (derived from b
where a winner i0 bids 0 for all items) and equilibrium (q,y) = max-eq(b 6∋i0), and best response b
′, all
defined in the statement of Lemma 3.2. If i0 does not change his bid, then the maximum equilibrium prices
remain the same. Hence, in the following we assume that i0 changes his bid according to b
′ and analyze the
relation between p and p′, where (p′,x′) = max-eq(b′). What we need to show is that p′ ≤ p.
By the proof of Lemma 3.2, we know that qj ≤ pj for all items. If q = p, i.e., qj = pj for all items, let
j∗ = argmaxj vij − qj . Note that di0 = vi0j∗ − qj∗ > 0. Since (p,x) is an equilibrium with respect to b, we
have bi0xi0 − pxi0 ≥ bi0j∗ − pj∗ and bi0xi0 6= 0. Since i0 has already made a best response bidding (either as
a loser or a winner), his bids for different items are aligned, i.e., vi0xi0 − bi0xi0 ≥ vi0j∗ − bi0j∗ . Thus,
ui0(p,x) = vi0xi0 − pxi0 ≥ vi0j∗ − pj∗ = vi0j∗ − qj∗ = di0
Hence, i0 already obtains his maximally possible utility and will not change his bid. In the following, we
assume q ≤ p and there is an item such that qj < pj .
Let T = {j | qj < pj} and S = {i | xi ∈ T } be the set of buyers who win items in T in (p,x). We
claim that i0 ∈ S. Otherwise, all buyers in S win all items in T in (q,y) as well with positive utilities and
they strictly prefer their corresponding allocations to those items that are not in T . Hence, we can increase
the prices of all items in T by ǫ to derive another equilibrium; this contradicts to the fact that (q,y) is a
max-eq. Therefore, there is exactly one buyer i∗ /∈ S who wins an item in T in (q,y) given bid vector b 6∋i0 ,
i.e., yi∗ ∈ T . Next when i0 changes his bid vector according to b′, by the proof of Lemma 3.1, the new
allocation vector x′, together with the given price vector q, constitutes an equilibrium. Let j0 = x
′
i0
; since
vi0j0 − qj0 = max
j
vi0j − qj = di0
> ui0(p,x)
= vi0xi0 − pxi0
≥ vi0j0 − pj0
we must have j0 ∈ T . That is, when i0 “joins the market again” from b 6∋i0 to b
′, he grabs an item in T
“again”. Since every buyer in S \ {i0} obtains a positive utility for his corresponding allocation in T in
(q,y) and strictly prefers it to those items that are not in T , he has to win an item in T in (q,x′). Hence,
the only buyer who is kicked out of winning an item in T is i∗. That is, buyers in S “again” win all items
in T . Finally, without loss of generality, we can assume that in x′ all items that are not in T have the
same allocations as x; this still keeps an equilibrium and will not affect the computation of the maximum
equilibrium price vector. Our argument above can be summarized as below:
bid vector equilibrium winners for items in T
b max-eq (p,x) S \ {i0} ∪ {i0}
b 6∋i0 max-eq (q,y) S \ {i0} ∪ {i
∗}
(q,x′)
b′
max-eq (p′,x′)
S \ {i0} ∪ {i0}
Finally we consider running the algorithm Alg-max-eq on equilibrium (q,x′) to derive the maximum
equilibrium (p′,x′). By the proof of Lemma 3.1, we have either p′j = qj or p
′
j = qj + ǫ. To the end of
proving p′j ≤ pj , it remains to show that it is impossible that p
′
j = qj + ǫ = pj + ǫ for all items; assume
otherwise that there is such an item jℓ (this implies that jℓ /∈ T ). Then again by the proof of Lemma 3.1,
the price of jℓ is increased (from q to p
′) through a max-alternating path P = (j0, i0, j1, i1, . . . , jℓ−1, iℓ−1, jℓ)
in the subgraph Gmaxj0 (b
′,q,x′). That is, for k = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 1, x′ik = jk and vikjk − qjk = vikjk+1 − qjk+1 .
Consider subgraph Gmaxjℓ (b,p,x), since (p,x) = max-eq(b), we cannot increase pjℓ and there is a critical
max-alternating path P ′ in Gmaxjℓ (b,p,x). Further, it can be seen that all items in P
′ are not in T (since
every buyer in P ′ strictly prefers the corresponding allocation in x to those items in T at price vector p).
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Since all items that are not in T have the same allocations in x and x′, we can expand path P through P ′,
which gives a critical max-alternating path in Gmaxj0 (b
′,q,x′). Therefore, we cannot increase the price of
any item in P ∪ P ′, including jℓ. This contradicts to our assumption that p′jℓ = qjℓ + ǫ; hence the lemma
follows.
B.4 Proof of Corollary 3.1
Proof. The claims for best responses follow directly from Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, and the proof of Lemma 3.3.
For the last claim, note that if (q,x) is an equilibrium for b′, then by the algorithm Alg-max-eq to increase
prices to derive the maximum equilibrium price vector p′, (p′,x) is a max-eq for b′. Recall in the proof of
Lemma 3.3, (q,x′) is an equilibrium of b′ and all items that are not in T have the same allocations as x,
where T = {j | qj < pj}. Thus, it remains to show that all items in T have the same allocations in x and
x′. Since all items in T are allocated to the same subset of buyers S in both x and x′, for any buyer i ∈ S,
we have
ui(p,x) = bixi − pxi ≥ bix′i − px′i
ui(q,x
′) = bix′
i
− qx′
i
≥ bixi − qxi , if i 6= i0
and
ui0(q,x
′) = b′i0x′i0
− qx′
i0
≥ b′i0xi0 − qxi0
=⇒ bi0x′i0
− qx′
i0
≥ bi0xi0 − qxi0
(The last inequality is because of the following argument: Assume that b′
i0x
′
i0
= bi0x′i0
− δ. Since i0 has
already made a best response bidding, his bid vector over different items has already been aligned. By the
best responses defined in Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, we have vi0x′i0
−bi0x′i0
≤ vi0x′i0
−b′i0x′i0
. Hence δ ≥ 0 and b′i0xi0 =
max{0, bi0xi0 − δ} ≥ bi0xi0 − δ. Therefore, bi0x′i0
− qx′
i0
= δ+ b′i0x′i0
− qx′
i0
≥ δ+ b′i0xi0 − qxi0 ≥ bi0xi0 − qxi0 .)
If items in T are allocated in different ways in x and x′, then there are T ′ ⊆ T and S′ ⊆ S such that items
in T ′ are allocated to buyers in S′ in x and x′ which forms an augmenting path. Adding the above two
inequalities (regarding ui(p,x) and ui(q,x
′)) for all buyers in S′ gives
∑
j∈T ′ pj+qj ≥
∑
j∈T ′ pj+qj . Hence,
all inequalities are tight, which implies that every buyer gets the same utility from xi and x
′
i. Therefore, we
can change the allocation of items in T ′ according to x, which still gives an equilibrium.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Assume that (q,y) = max-eq(b 6∋i0) and (p
′,x) = max-eq(b′), where b′ is the resulting bid vector
after i0 makes his best response bidding (by Corollary 3.1, we can assume that the equilibrium allocation is
the same for b and b′). Further, by the proof of Corollary 3.1, we know that (q,x) is an equilibrium for b′.
In the two allocations x and y, consider the following alternating path:
P = (i0, j0 = xi0 , i1, j1, . . . , iℓ, jℓ, iℓ+1)
where ik wins jk in x and ik+1 wins jk in y, and xiℓ+1 = ∅ (this implies, in particular, biℓ+1jℓ = qjℓ). Further,
we have
bik+1jk − qjk = bik+1jk+1 − qjk+1 , for k = 0, . . . , ℓ
We will analyze the relation between q and the price vector after i′0 makes his best response bidding to show
the desired result.
• First consider the next best response is made by another winner i′0. After i
′
0 makes his best response
bidding denote the resulting bid vector by b′′), by Corollary 3.1, we know that all winners have the
same allocations x. Further, the above set of equations still holds for all buyers in P for b′′. This is
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because, if i′0 is one of them, say ik+1 = i
′
0, then both bik+1jk and bik+1jk+1 are reduced by the same
amount to derive b′′ik+1jk and b
′′
ik+1jk+1
; so we still have b′′ik+1jk − qjk = b
′′
ik+1jk+1
− qjk+1 . Hence, the
price of any item j in path P , as well as those that give the maximal utility to i0, cannot be smaller
than qj in max-eq(b
′′) (otherwise, iℓ+1 has to be a winner).
Therefore, when i0 bids zero for all items after i
′
0 makes his best response bidding, the price of item
j0 cannot be smaller than qj0 in a max-eq(b
′′
6∋i0) as reallocating items according to P where iℓ+1
becomes a winner gives an equilibrium allocation. By Corollary 3.1, which says that every winner
obtains the same item after his best response bidding, we know that the best response of i0 is to bid
the same vector, i.e., do not change his bid.
• Next consider the next best response is made by a loser i′0; let b
′′ be the resulting bid vector. By the
proof of Lemma 3.1, let (p′,x′) be an equilibrium of b′′, where p′ is the maximum equilibrium price of
b′ defined above and x′ is derived from x (the allocation before i′0’s bid) through an alternating path:
P ′ = (i′0, j
′
1, i
′
1, . . . , j
′
r, i
′
r)
where i′k wins j
′
k in x and i
′
k wins j
′
k+1 in x
′, and i′r does not win in x
′. (Note that to derive a max-eq
for b′′, we still need to verify if the price of j′1 can be increased in the subgraph G
max
j′
1
(b′′,p′,x′).)
Assume that i0 is still a winner after i
′
0’s bid; note that the item that i0 wins in x
′ can be either the
one defined above according to P ′ or the same item j0 = xi0 . Next we consider the setting when i0
bids zero for all items, i.e., b′′ 6∋i0 , for the two possibilities respectively.
If it is the former, i.e., i′k = i0, j
′
k = j0 and x
′
i0
= j′k+1, then the price of j
′
k and j
′
k+1 cannot be smaller
than p′
j′
k
(which is at least qj′
k
) and p′
j′
k+1
(which is at least qj′
k+1
) respectively in a max-eq(b′′ 6∋i0)
as we are able to reallocate items j′k+1, . . . , j
′
r back to i
′
k+1, . . . , i
′
r, respectively, where j
′
r becomes a
winner. Since di0 defined in Lemma 3.2 will not increase, the best response of i0 is to bid the same
vector, i.e., do not change his bid.
If it is the latter, i.e., i0 wins the same item j0 in x and x
′, we claim that the price of j0 cannot be
smaller than qj0 in a max-eq(b
′′
6∋i0). This is because: (i) We can reallocate items according to P such
that iℓ+1 becomes a winner. (ii) If any item in P
′ appears in P or i′0 = iℓ+1 (i.e., i
′
0 is the last buyer
on path P ), similar to the above arguments, we can reallocate items according P and P ′ such that i′r
becomes a winner. (Note that for the last case i′0 = iℓ+1, since bi′0jℓ = biℓ+1jℓ = qjℓ and the bids of i
′
0
have already been aligned, jℓ will give the maximal utility for i0 when its price is qjℓ .)
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. An equivalent way to consider the best response of i0 is that he first bids 0 for all items (which yields
the same max-eq (p,x)), then bids according to the best response of winners defined in Lemma 3.2. Then
we can apply the same argument as Proposition 3.1 to get the desired result.
B.7 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof. The proof of the claim is by induction on the process that buyers make the best response bidding.
For every such best response bidding, we use the same proof in the above Proposition 3.1 and 3.2 to get the
desired result.
C Proofs in Section 4
To prove our results, we need the following definition, which is similar to max-alternating path.
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Definition C.1 (min-alternating path). Given any equilibrium (p,x) of a given bid b, let G = G(b,p)
be its demand graph. For any item j, a path (j = j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, (iℓ)) in G is called a min-alternating
path if edges are not in and in the allocation x alternatively, i.e., xik = jk+1 for all possible k. Denote
by Gminj (b,p,x) (or simply G
min
j when the parameters are clear from the context) the subgraph of G(b,p)
(containing both buyers and items including j itself) reachable from j through min-alternating paths with
respect to x. A min-alternating path (j = j1, i1, j2, i2, . . . , jℓ, iℓ) in G
min
j (b,p,x) is called critical if xiℓ = ∅
and biℓjℓ = pjℓ .
Note that the major difference between max and min-alternating paths is that in the former, edges in
the path are in and not in the allocation x alternatively; whereas in the latter, edges in the path are not in
and in x alternatively. Similar to Corollary 2.1, we have the following claim. (The last pair jℓ and (iℓ) in
a critical min-alternating path is the exact reason that why the price pj cannot be decreased further, since
otherwise iℓ will have to be a winner and items are over-demanded.)
Corollary C.1. Given any bid vector b and (p,x) = min-eq(b), for any item j, there is a critical min-
alternating path in Gminj (b,p,x).
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. By the definition of (p,x) and (q,y), we have p ≤ q. Let T = {j | pj + ǫ < qj} and S = {i | yi ∈ T },
i.e., S is the subset of buyers that win items in T in the max-eq (q,y). Then for any j /∈ T , either pj = qj
or pj + ǫ = qj . Assume that T 6= ∅; similar to the proof of Lemma A.1, we know that all buyers in S still
win items in T in the min-eq (p,x).
Consider any i0 ∈ S and let j0 = yi0 ∈ T . Consider a bid vector (b
′
i0j
)j where b
′
i0j0
= qj0 − ǫ and b
′
i0j
= 0
for any j 6= j0; denote the resulting bid vector by b′ (where the bids of all other buyers remain the same).
Consider a tuple (q′,y′), where q′j = qj − ǫ if j ∈ T and q
′
j = qj if j /∈ T , and y
′
i = yi if i ∈ S and y
′
i = xi if
i /∈ S. It can be seen that (q′,y′) is an equilibrium for b′. Note that b′i0j0 = qj0 − ǫ = q
′
j0
; thus, i0 cannot
obtain j0 if its price q
′
j0
is increased any further.
Let (q∗,y∗) = max-eq(b′); note that q′ ≤ q∗. We claim that i0 still wins j0 at price q∗j0 = q
′
j0
in (q∗,y∗).
(This fact implies that i0 obtains more utility from j0 by paying ǫ less when bidding (b
′
i0j
); thus max-eq
(q,y) is not a Nash equilibrium.) Assume otherwise, then i0 does not win any item in (q
∗,y∗) since b′i0j = 0
for any j 6= j0. Because q∗j0 ≥ q
′
j0
> pj0 ≥ 0, there must be a (non-dummy) buyer winning j0: assume that
i1 wins j0 = y
′
i0
, i2 wins j1 , y
′
i1
, i3 wins j2 , y
′
i2
, . . ., ik wins jk−1 , y
′
ik−1
in (q∗,y∗), and ik is the first
buyer in the chain that is not in S (such buyer must exist since i0 is not a winner). Let jk , y
′
ik
= xik (note
that jk /∈ T ); then we have q
∗
jk
≥ q′jk = qjk ≥ pjk and at least one of the two inequalities is strict (since
ik wins another item jk−1 at a higher price compared to (p,x)). This implies that there must be another
buyer ik+1 winning jk in (q
∗,y∗). In the process all dummy buyers will not be introduced to win any item;
hence, the same argument continues and will not stop, which contradicts to the fact that buyers and items
are finite.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The claim follows from the following two claims.
Proposition C.1. For any item j, pj ≥ p∗j .
Proof. Assume otherwise that there is an item j1 such that pj1 < p
∗
j1
. Assume that i1 wins j1 in x
∗ and j2
in x, i.e., x∗i1 = j1 and xi1 = j2. Since (p
∗,x∗) is an equilibrium for the true valuation vector v, we have
vi1j1 − p
∗
j1
≥ vi1j2 − p
∗
j2
. Hence, if pj2 ≥ p
∗
j2
, then
vi1j1 − pj1 > vi1j1 − p
∗
j1
≥ vi1j2 − p
∗
j2
≥ vi1j2 − pj2
That is, ui1(p,x) = vi1j2 − pj2 < vi1j1 − pj1 ≤ di1 (defined in Lemma 3.2). If i1 has yet made any best
response bidding, then he should bid his best response according to Lemma 3.2. If he has already made
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best response bidding, then his bid vector has already been aligned and the above inequality implies that
bi1j1 − pj1 > bi1j2 − pj2 , which contradicts to the fact that (p,x) is an equilibrium for the bid vector b.
Hence, we must have pj2 < p
∗
j2
.
Consider the subgraph G given by the exclusive-OR operation of the two allocations x and x∗. For any
alternating path (i′1, j
′
1, . . . , i
′
ℓ, j
′
ℓ, i
′
ℓ+1) where i
′
k wins j
′
k in (p
∗,x∗) and i′k+1 wins j
′
k in (p,x), if pj′k < p
∗
j′
k
for any k, then by the above argument and considering buyer i′k, we have pj′k−1 < p
∗
j′
k−1
. Applying the same
argument recursively yields pj′
1
< p∗j′
1
. Since 0 ≤ vi′
1
j′
1
− p∗j′
1
< vi′
1
j′
1
− pj′
1
and i′1 does not win any item in
(p,x), by Corollary 3.1 buyer i′1 should continue to make a best response bidding, which contradicts to the
fact that (p,x) is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, for any alternating path in G, all items have pj ≥ p∗j . For any
alternating cycle in G, if there is an item with pj < p
∗
j , by applying the above argument for j1 recursively,
all items in the cycle have pj < p
∗
j .
Continue to consider the above item j1 with pj1 < p
∗
j1
. Since (p∗,x∗) = min-eq(v), by Corollary C.1 and
abusing notations, there is a critical min-alternating path P = (j1, i
′
2, j
′
2, . . . , i
′
r−1, j
′
r−1, i
′
r) in G
min
j1
(v,p∗,x∗),
where x∗i′
k
= j′k for k = 2, . . . , r − 1, i
′
r does not win any item and vi′rj′r−1 = p
∗
j′
r−1
. Consider buyer i′2; by the
definition of Gminj1 , we have
vi′
2
j1 − pj1 > vi′2j1 − p
∗
j1
= vi′
2
j′
2
− p∗j′
2
≥ vi′
2
x
i′
2
− p∗x
i′
2
By the same above argument, we have px
i′
2
< p∗x
i′
2
. Then considering the alternating cycle containing
j′2 = x
∗
i′
2
, i′2, xi′2 , we have pj′2 < p
∗
j′
2
. The same argument applies to all items in P recursively; hence, we
have pj < p
∗
j for all items in the path P . This implies, in particular, that i
′
r is a winner in (p,x) since
vi′
r
j′
r−1
= p∗
j′
r−1
> pj′
r−1
and by the best response characterized in Corollary 3.1.
Consider the item that i′r wins in (p,x); let j
′
r = xi′r . Since any buyer in an alternating cycle of G win
in both (p,x) and (p∗,x)∗, i′r and j
′
r must be at an endpoint of an alternating path of G. Further, by the
above argument regarding the prices of items in alternating paths, we have pj′
r
≥ p∗j′
r
. Therefore,
vi′
r
j′
r−1
− pj′
r−1
> 0 ≥ vi′
r
j′
r
− p∗j′
r
≥ vi′
r
j′
r
− pj′
r
That is, ui′
r
(p,x) = vi′
r
j′
r
− pj′
r
< vi′
r
j′
r−1
− pj′
r−1
≤ di′
r
(defined in Lemma 3.2). We can apply the same
argument above for i1 to get a similar contradiction.
Hence, the claim follows.
Proposition C.2. For every item j, if pj > p
∗
j + ǫ then the corresponding winner can obtain more utility
by bidding his best response.
Proof. From the above claim, we have p∗ ≤ p. Let T1 = {j | p∗j + ǫ < pj} and T2 = {j | p
∗
j + ǫ = pj}. and
S1 = {i | xi ∈ T1} and S2 = {i | xi ∈ T2}, i.e., S1 and S2 are the subset of buyers that win items in T1 and
T2 in the max-eq (p,x), respectively. Then for any j /∈ T1 ∪ T2, we have p∗j = pj .
Consider any buyer i and item j ∈ T1∪T2. If i does not win any item in the min-eq (p∗,x∗), i.e., x∗i = ∅,
then vij ≤ p∗j < pj , which implies that i cannot win j in (p,x). If i wins an item not in T1 ∪ T2 in (p
∗,x∗),
then
vix∗
i
− px∗
i
= vix∗
i
− p∗x∗
i
≥ vij − p
∗
j > vij − pj
This implies that if i wins j in (p,x), then he should continue to make a best response bidding by Lemma 3.2,
which contradicts the fact that b is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, all buyers in S1 ∪ S2 win all items in
T1 ∪ T2 in both (p∗,x∗) and (p,x).
Assume that T1 6= ∅; consider any i0 ∈ S1 and let j0 = x∗i0 . Consider a bid vector (b
′
i0j
)j where
b′i0j0 = p
∗
j0
+ ǫ and b′i0j = 0 for any j 6= j0; denote the resulting bid vector by b
′ (where the bids of all other
buyers remain the same). Consider a tuple (p′,x), where p′j = p
∗
j + ǫ if j ∈ T1∪T2 and p
′
j = p
∗
j if j /∈ T1∪T2.
It can be seen that (p′,x) is an equilibrium for b′. Note that b′i0j0 = p
∗
j0
+ ǫ = p′j0 ; thus, i0 cannot obtain j0
if its price p′j0 is increased any further.
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Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can show that in i0 still wins j0 at price p
′
j0
in max-eq(b′).
Since
vi0j0 − p
′
j0
= vi0j0 − p
∗
j0
− ǫ ≥ vi0xi0 − p
∗
xi0
− ǫ > vi0xi0 − pxi0
we know that i0 obtains more utility when changing bids from b to b
′, which is again a contradiction.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof. Consider the equilibrium (p,x) = max-eq(b). For any loser i, by the best response rule of Lemma 3.1,
we know that vij ≤ pj for all items. For any winner i, we have vixi−pxi ≥ 0; further, for any item j 6= xi, by
the best response rule of Lemma 3.2, we have ui(p,x) = vixi − pxi ≥ di ≥ vij − pj, where the first inequality
follows from the fact that the dynamics converges, and the second inequality follows from the observation
that when i bids zero, all prices will not increase.
Let x∗ be an efficient allocation and maximizes social welfare. Given the existence of dummy buyers, we
can assume without loss of generality that all items all sold out in both x and x∗. Consider the exclusive-OR
relation given by the two allocations; it can be seen that it contains either alternating paths of even length
where both endpoints are buyers or alternating cycles.
If there is an alternating path of even length, say,
i1
x
—– j1
x
∗
—– i2
x
—– j2
x
∗
—– · · · · · ·
x
∗
—– ir−1
x
—– jr−1
x
∗
—– ir
By the above discussions, we have
vi1j1 − pj1 ≥ 0
vikjk − pjk ≥ vikjk−1 − pjk−1 , 2 ≤ k ≤ r − 1
0 ≥ virjr−1 − pjr−1
Adding these inequalities together yields
∑
(i,j)∈x
vij =
∑
1≤k≤r−1
vikjk ≥
∑
2≤k≤r
vikjk−1 =
∑
(i,j)∈x∗
vij
which implies that x has the same maximum total valuation on such a path as x∗.
The analysis is similar on alternating cycles. Hence, the allocation x is efficient as well, which completes
the proof.
D Nash Equilibria with Various Equilibrium Prices
The following examples show that in general the max-eq prices in a Nash equilibrium can be either (much)
smaller or higher than the min-eq price vector at truthful bidding. These examples are in contrast with
the statement of Theorem 4.2 which says that when buyers bid aligned vectors initially, we always have
max-eq(b) ≈ min-eq(v).
Example D.1. (Nash equilibrium with small max-eq prices) There are n+1 buyers i0, i1, . . . , in and
n items j1, . . . , jn. Buyer i0 only desires j1 with value vi0j1 = nǫ; buyer ik only desires jk and jk+1 with value
vikjk = vikjk+1 = nǫ for k = 1, . . . , n − 1; and buyer in only desires jn with value vinjn = nǫ. That is, all
buyers have the same value nǫ for the items that they desire. It can be seen that in the minimum equilibrium
(p∗,x∗) = min-eq(v), p∗j = nǫ for all items. On the other hand, consider the bid vector b, allocation vector
x (where xik = jk+1 and in does not win any item), and price vector p given by the following figure:
It can be seen that (p,x) is a max-eq of b. Further, b is a Nash equilibrium for the max-eq mechanism.
(Indeed, for any buyer ik, the maximum equilibrium price vector for bid vector b 6∋ik where ik bids zero for
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j1 j2 j3 jn−2 jn−1 jn
i0 i1 i2 in−2 in−1 in
ǫ 2ǫ 3ǫ (n− 2)ǫ (n− 1)ǫ nǫ
ǫ ǫ 2ǫ 2ǫ 3ǫ (n− 2)ǫ (n− 1)ǫ
(n− 1)ǫ
nǫ nǫ
all items is the same as p. For any buyer ik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, by Lemma 3.2, the utility of ik is maximized
when bidding b′ikjk = b
′
ikjk+1
= (k + 1)ǫ; in this case, however, the price of jk will be increased to (k + 1)ǫ;
hence, ik will obtain the same utility as uik(p,x). We can verify that buyers i0 and in cannot obtain more
utilities similarly.) Hence, the equilibrium price vector in a Nash equilibrium of the max-eq mechanism can
be (much) smaller than the minimum equilibrium price vector p∗.
Example D.2. (Nash equilibrium with large max-eq prices) There are n + 1 buyers i0, i1, . . . , in
and n items j1, . . . , jn. Buyer i0 only desires j1 with value vi0j1 = ǫ; buyer ik only desires jk and jk+1 with
value vikjk = vikjk+1 = nǫ for k = 1, . . . , n − 1; and buyer in only desires jn with value vinjn = nǫ. It can
be seen that in the minimum equilibrium (p∗,x∗) = min-eq(v), p∗j = ǫ for all items. On the other hand,
consider the bid vector b, allocation vector x (where xik = jk and i0 does not win any item), and price vector
p given by the following figure:
j1 j2 j3 jn−2 jn−1 jn
i0 i1 i2 in−2 in−1 in
ǫ 2ǫ 3ǫ (n− 2)ǫ (n− 1)ǫ nǫ
ǫ ǫ 2ǫ 2ǫ 3ǫ (n− 2)ǫ (n− 1)ǫ
(n− 1)ǫ
nǫ nǫ
It can be seen that (p,x) is a max-eq of b. Further, b is a Nash equilibrium for the max-eq mechanism.
(Indeed, for any buyer ik, the maximum equilibrium price vector for bid vector b 6∋ik where ik bids zero for all
items is the same as p. Similar to the above example, we can verify that no buyer cannot obtain more utility
by unilaterally changing his bid.) Hence, the equilibrium price vector in a Nash equilibrium of the max-eq
mechanism can be (much) larger than the minimum equilibrium price vector p∗.
The above examples are not contradictory to Theorem 4.2, which says that starting from any aligned bid
vector, the aligned best response dynamics converges to the min-eq prices. In particular, the initials bid
vectors b in the above examples are not aligned; hence, the claim in Theorem 4.2 does not apply here.
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